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AT TICKETMASTER, SCALPERS SCORE AND FANS COME LAST 
Debra Parma* 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO TICKETMASTER’S ILLEGAL SCHEME 
For years, consumers and ticket scalpers engaged in battles to secure 
tickets to popular events like Hamilton through Ticketmaster. Unbeknownst 
to consumers, Ticketmaster has been working against them the entire time. 
Through the assistance of software, frequently referred to as “bots,” scalpers 
can obtain massive amounts of tickets that they then resell on the secondary 
ticket market for tremendous markups.1 For instance, if one wanted to attend 
a Broadway performance of Hamilton on January 2, 2019, the only available 
tickets are Ticketmaster’s verified resale tickets, priced from $475 to $1,024, 
plus fees.2 
According to Ticketmaster, a single scalper managed to buy 30,000 
tickets to Hamilton using bots.3 In a statement from the company, it said 
“Ticketmaster has zero tolerance for bots and will continue to employ all 
available methods to stop their usage.”4 An investigation by the New York 
attorney general’s office revealed that a broker could buy over 1,000 tickets 
in just one minute, then reselling the tickets with an average mark up of 
roughly 50%.5 Needless to say, this is far faster than a human’s ability to 
purchase tickets, putting consumers at a significant disadvantage. Ultimately, 
these bots acquired between 30-40% of Ticketmaster’s Hamilton ticket 
inventory, but bots were easily able to acquire the majority of tickets for 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Debra Parma is a graduate of University Pittsburgh School of Law and a former managing editor 
of the Journal of Law and Commerce. 
1 Avi Loewenstein, Note, Ticket Sniping, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 243, 244 (2010). 
2 TICKETMASTER, https://www.ticketmaster.com (last visited Dec. 28, 2018). 
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events occurring less frequently than Hamilton.6 Because of the massive 
amounts of inventory swept up by bots, consumers find themselves forced 
into the secondary market and paying huge mark ups. 
Bots are a persistent problem for both Ticketmaster and consumers, but, 
as it turns out, Ticketmaster appears to have taken on the motto “if you can’t 
beat them, join them.” At a ticketing convention, a team of undercover 
journalists learned of Ticketmaster’s own bot that the company marketed to 
scalpers to resell tickets, in violation of Ticketmaster’s own terms.7 While 
Ticketmaster denies the allegations, a Ticketmaster employee claims that 100 
scalpers successfully used Ticketmaster’s own software to sell between 
thousands and several million tickets each year.8 
First, this Note will explore Ticketmaster’s corporate and historical 
background. Second, it will review the statutory and jurisprudential history 
relevant to Ticketmaster, scalping bots, and antitrust law. Third, the Note will 
analyze these relevant provisions in light of Ticketmaster’s actions in 
marketing its own bot to scalpers and, finally, offer solutions that would be 
effective in preventing Ticketmaster’s actions. 
This Note will prove that previous attempts to prevent scalpers and bots 
from buying up tickets to popular events have been unsuccessful because 
Ticketmaster is operating to monopolize both the primary and secondary 
ticketing markets through illegal, unfair, and deceptive acts and the most 
effective way to prevent Ticketmaster’s behavior is a joint response from 
both the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Attorney General. 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 Annlee Ellingson, Suit: Scalpers used bots for ‘Hamilton’ tickets, BIZWOMEN (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/latest-news/2017/10/suit-scalpers-used-bots-for-hamilton-
tickets.html. 
7 Anastasia Tsioulcas, Ticketmaster Has Its Own Secret ‘Scalping Program,’ Canadian Journalists 
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II. A CORPORATE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Ticketmaster’s Corporate Background 
“At Ticketmaster, we strive to put fans first,” Ticketmaster claims in its 
company description, citing its merger with Live Nation as one of the many 
ways it works to put fans first.9 
Through the years, Ticketmaster expanded its network to become the 
ticketing giant it is today. In 2010, despite much contention, Ticketmaster 
merged with Live Nation.10 This merger brought together Live Nation, 
Ticketmaster, and Ticketmaster’s network of companies, which also includes 
TicketWeb, TicketNow, House of Blues, Universe, NFL Ticket Exchange, 
NBATickets.com, and NHL Ticket Exchange.11 
Ticketmaster also introduced its own in-site secondary market, not to be 
outshined by Stubhub’s secondary ticket market success. On the surface, 
Ticketmaster’s Verified Resale Tickets offers consumers an opportunity to 
sell their tickets to events that they could no longer attend to other interested 
fans on their “fan-to-fan” resale market.12 Ticketmaster guarantees that 
“every seat you sell—comes with peace of mind.”13 Per the company, its 
resale market is “the easiest and safest way to sell your tickets.”14 However, 
in many instances, this transaction does not involve one fan selling to another 
fan and instead is a consumer paying a huge markup to professional ticket 
scalpers. 
Ticketmaster profits from ticket fees on both primary and resale ticket 
purchases. The total ticket price can consist of the face value price, 
determined by the client, a service fee, also called a “convenience charge,” 
an order processing fee, which “offsets the costs of ticket handling, shipping 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 Who We Are, TICKETMASTER, https://www.ticketmaster.com/about/about-us.html?tm_link= 
abouttm_about (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
10 Ben Sisario & Graham Bowley, Live Nation Rules Music Ticketing, Some Say With Threats, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/arts/music/live-nation-ticketmaster.html. 
11 Our Network, TICKETMASTER, https://www.ticketmaster.com/about/about-us.html?tm_link= 
abouttm_about (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
12 Ticketmaster Verified Resale, TICKETMASTER, https://www.ticketmaster.com/verified?_ga=2 
.215469331.500223346.1546445884-100937779.1546445884 (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
13 TICKETMASTER, https://my.ticketmaster.com/event/160054D299314852/sell (last visited 
Dec. 28, 201). 
14 Id. 
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and support,” a delivery fee, a facility charge, and taxes.15 Ticketmaster states 
that its “clients typically share in a portion of the fees” collected and the 
portion Ticketmaster itself keeps “helps . . . to provide [its] clients with 
software, equipment, services and support to manage their tickets and box 
office, and provide the sales network used by clients to distribute tickets to 
fans.”16 Finally, the amount remaining after all of this contributes to it profits, 
per Ticketmaster.17 
Interestingly, of its facility charges, Ticketmaster claims that it “does 
not share in facility charges,” but rather “simply [collects] them for venues,” 
but neglects to mention just how many venues Live Nation and Ticketmaster 
operate, discussed infra.18 Additionally, in regards to the service fees added 
to resale tickets, Ticketmaster bases this fee amount on the resale listing 
price, whereas Ticketmaster bases the service fee for the primary market 
tickets on agreements with the client.19 For instance, Ticketmaster attaches a 
service fee in the amount of $82.40 to a resale ticket priced at $515 for 
Hamilton, whereas an orchestra seat on the primary market priced at $749 
comes with only a $25 service fee.20 
By navigating Ticketmaster’s webpage, consumers agree to the site’s 
terms of use.21 Within these terms, Ticketmaster establishes a code of 
conduct that a user agrees to follow, in addition to all applicable laws, which 
includes not using Ticketmaster for illegal or commercial purposes, and not 
impersonating a person or entity—all of which bot users violate.22 In the next 
section of its terms, Ticketmaster expressly forbids the use of bots to 
“reserve, buy, or otherwise obtain tickets.”23 Additionally, site users agree, 
merely by using the Ticketmaster website, to waive their right to a jury trial 
and to engage in class action suits against Ticketmaster.24 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 How are ticket prices and fees determined?, TICKETMASTER, https://help.ticketmaster.com/s/ 
article/How-are-ticket-prices-and-fees-determined?language=en_US (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. See infra section III.B and notes 84–85. 
19 TICKETMASTER, supra note 15. 
20 TICKETMASTER, supra note 2. 
21 Terms of Use, TICKETMASTER, https://www.ticketmaster.com/h/terms.html?tm_link=tm_i 
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B. Scalping and Secondary Market Ticket Resales 
The secondary ticketing market is booming, raking in $15 billion per 
year.25 This market is far from a new phenomenon, with scalpers selling 
Charles Dickens tickets for ten times their face value in 1860.26 However, 
part of the reason that this market reached this magnitude is courtesy of 
scalpers’ use of bots inflating the market with massive amounts of tickets that 
they deprived from the primary market. These bots allow scalpers to flood 
Ticketmaster with requests and allow them to purchase massive ticket 
amounts before the average consumer.27 Even if a consumer attempts to get 
tickets right as they become available, bots already “have packed the queue 
with automated requests at superhuman speed.”28 According to Ticketmaster, 
bots make 80% of its total ticket requests on some days.29 One scalper 
admitted to making over 600,000 requests in one day using bots.30 
These bots buy tickets, relist them on the secondary market, monitor 
pricing, and adjust it as necessary in order to sell the scalper’s inventory.31 
Ticket retailers apply anti-bot technology measures to counter the bots, but 
bot advancements thwart these measures.32 These bots have grown more 
sophisticated, with scalpers designing them to actually appear human to 
Ticketmaster, occasionally engaging in human error, like mis-clicking, to 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 Sharon Eberson, ‘Hamilton’ Is Coming to Pittsburgh. And with It Comes the Cyber Scalpers, 
PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.post-gazette.com/ae/theater-dance/2018/03/25/ 
Hamilton-Pittsburgh-Cultural-Trust-cyber-scalpers-BOTS-Bill-of-2016-
CAPTCHA/stories/201803220196. 
26 Kieran McLean, Cultural Trust Defends Against ‘Hamilton’ Ticket Buying Bots, 90.5 WESA 
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.wesa.fm/post/cultural-trust-defends-against-hamilton-ticket-buying-bots. 
27 Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 245. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 247. 
30 Id. 
31 Tiff Fehr, To Learn About ‘Hamilton’ Ticket Bots, We Wrote Our Own Bot, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 29, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/upshot/to-learn-about-hamilton-ticket-bots-we-wrote-our-
own-bot.html. 
32 The Editorial Board, The ‘Hamilton’ Experiment: How to Fight the Bots for Tickets, CHI. TRIB. 
(Jun. 9, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-hamilton-tickets-bots-
scalpers-edit-0610-md-20160609-story.html. 
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throw Ticketmaster of their trail.33 These bots are “screen scrapers,” or bots 
that mimic behaviors of human buyers using Ticketmaster.34 
In 2016, then New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman called 
ticketing a “fixed game,” one which consumers were losing.35 Even where 
ticket purchasing limits were in place, these bots still managed to get around 
these measures, purchasing over 1,000 tickets per minute and reselling these 
tickets on average 49% more than the original price and sometimes up to ten 
times the original price.36 
In 2018, the United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
investigated ticket sales and found that scalpers and consumers are on uneven 
playing field through their usage, resulting in tickets becoming only available 
to consumers in the resale market.37 No federal regulation governs event 
ticketing, but the BOTS Act does forbid people using software or otherwise 
to circumvent security or other measures to protect ticketing limits or rules.38 
III. STATUTORY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND 
A. Antitrust Statutes and Jurisprudence 
The Sherman Act, codified under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–11, forbids “every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce. . . .”39 It also forbids monopolies, “or 
attempt[s] to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States. . . .”40 
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
Rockefeller’s companies engaged in an attempt to monopolize the movement 
                                                                                                                           
 
33 Tiff Fehr, How Scalpers Make Their Millions with ‘Hamilton,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 29 2016), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/upshot/how-scalpers-make-their-millions-with-hamilton.html. 
34 McLean, supra note 26. 
35 Terry Carter, New York AG Says Ticket Sales for Concerts, Sporting Events Is a ‘Fixed Game’ 
won by ‘Ticket Bots,’ ABA J. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_york_ag 
_says_ticket_sales_for_concerts_sporting_events_is_a_fixed_game. 
36 Id. 
37 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-347, EVENT TICKET SALES (2018). 
38 Id. at 48; see supra Section III.A and note 58. 
39 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018). 
40 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
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of petroleum, violating the Sherman Act, and ordered for their dissolution.41 
The facts of the case show that Standard Oil “had obtained a complete 
mastery over the oil industry, controlling 90 per cent  of the business. . . .”42 
Standard Oil effectively controlled all aspects of the oil business, including 
“producing, shipping, refining and selling petroleum and its products, and 
thus was able to fix the price of . . . petroleum and to restrain and monopolize 
all interstate commerce in those products.”43 While the Standard Oil 
companies did not control 100% of the market, the companies retained 
“substantial power,” which “serve[s] to add additional cogency to the 
presumption of intent to monopolize. . . .”44 
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the Supreme Court held that 
Socony-Vacuum Oil violated the Sherman Act by conspiring and actually 
artificially raising oil and gas prices in markets, thereby increasing prices for 
consumers.45 The company controlled 83% of the mid-western area market 
and was “fully integrated—producing crude oil, having pipe lines for 
shipment of the crude to its refineries, refining crude oil, and marketing 
gasoline at retail and at wholesale.”46 While there was no evidence of 
coercion, the company “had the power to raise prices and acted together for 
that purpose, the combination was illegal; and that it was immaterial how 
reasonable or unreasonable those prices were or to what extent they had been 
affected by the combination.”47 
In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., the Supreme Court 
sustained an injunction against Paramount Pictures and its affiliates from 
granting licenses only to its own theaters, which was “exclusionary,” and 
“designed to strengthen their hold on the exhibition field.”48 However, the 
Court remanded this issue back to the District Court to make a determination 
on whether a monopoly existed “[f]or when the starting point is a conspiracy 
to effect a monopoly through restraints of trade, it is relevant to determine 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81–82 (1911). 
42 Id. at 33. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 77. 
45 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940). 
46 Id. at 191. 
47 Id. at 191, 210–11. 
48 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 170 (1948). 
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what the results of the conspiracy were. . . .”49 Per the Court, the relevant 
inquiry “is the relationship of the unreasonable restraints of trade to the 
position of the defendants in the . . . field.”50 
The Court holds that to determine whether vertical integration is illegal 
under the Sherman Act, the Court considers “(1) the purpose or intent with 
which it was conceived, or (2) the power it creates and the attendant purpose 
or intent.”51 As such, a monopoly exists under such circumstances when a 
vertically integrated enterprise has “a power to exclude competition . . . 
coupled with a purpose or intent to do so.”52 Size is an indicator of this, “[f]or 
size carries with it an opportunity for abuse.”53 In this, “the fact that the power 
created by size was utilized . . . to crush or prevent competition is potent 
evidence that the requisite purpose or intent attends the presence of monopoly 
power.”54 The “nature of the market to be served” must also be considered in 
whether the vertical integration created a monopoly as well as “the leverage 
on the market within the particular vertical integration makes possible.”55 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) forbids “unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce. . . .”56 The act, which created the 
Federal Trade Commission, empowers it to prevent entities from engaging in 
such unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices.57 Also within 
the FTC Act is the BOTS Act, which makes it illegal “to circumvent a 
security measure, access control system, or other technological control or 
measure on an Internet website . . . used by the ticket issuer to enforce posted 
event ticket purchasing limits . . . or to maintain . . . purchasing order rules” 
as well as “to sell or offer to sell any event ticket . . .”obtained through 
circumventing security measures or otherwise.58 
In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the Supreme Court construed a 
broad definition of “unfair conduct,” as described in 15 U.S.C. § 45 holding 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 Id. at 171. 
50 Id. at 172. 





56 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (2018). 
57 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(2) (2018). 
58 15 U.S.C. § 45C (2018). 
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that Congress did not intend to limit this definition.59 The Court turned to the 
legislative history of the FTC Act, which manifested Congress’s intention to 
“leave it to the commission to determine what practices were unfair.”60 Per 
the Court, Congress granted this power to the FTC with a broad “sweep and 
flexibility. . . .”61 In fact, this branches beyond antitrust laws, allowing the 
FTC, “like a court of equity, [to consider] public values beyond simply those 
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.”62 In 
doing so, the FTC must articulate a “‘rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made.’”63 
B. Ticketmaster’s Encounters with the Law 
In 2009, the FTC set forth a complaint against Ticketmaster, charging 
that the ticketing giant “used deceptive bait-and-switch tactics to sell event 
tickets” for Bruce Springsteen’s summer tour.64 In attempting to secure 
tickets through Ticketmaster, consumers received a notification stating “No 
Tickets Found,” and the site then redirected them to TicketsNow, a ticket 
resale site owned by Ticketmaster, where tickets were available for 
sometimes quadruple the face value of the ticket.65 Per the FTC, this also 
occurred for other events.66 Ticketmaster settled with the FTC in 2010, 
resulting in no official finding or ruling that Ticketmaster violated the law.67 
As a result of the settlement, Ticketmaster refunded consumers that 
purchased resale tickets on TicketsNow for the Bruce Springsteen tour, but 
not consumers who suffered the same deception for the many other events 
for which this also occurred.68 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 240 (1972). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 241. 
62 Id. at 244. 
63 Id. at 249 (citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
64 Ticketmaster and TicketsNow Settle FTC Charges of Deceptive Sales Tactics, Refunds for 
Springsteen Concergoers Provided; FTC Warns Other Ticket Resellers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https:// 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/02/ticketmaster-ticketsnow-settle-ftc-charges-deceptive-
sales (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
65 Id. 




472 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 38:463 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.186 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
In 2003, a class action was initiated against Ticketmaster, filed under 
Schleisinger v. Ticketmaster, and charged that “Ticketmaster’s fees were 
excessive and misleading.”69 The lawsuit settled in 2013, with the parties 
agreeing that Ticketmaster would pay $42 million over four years.70 
Ticketmaster decided to do this in the form of vouchers, one type of which 
consumers could only redeem for specific events at venues that Live Nation 
operates.71 Ticketmaster releases eligible events once yearly to the roughly 
57 million people that it issued vouchers to for a total of $386 million in 
vouchers.72 Ultimately, “the odds are a lot of people will never get the chance 
to claim their free tickets.”73 
Recently, Ticketmaster brought suit against a company that uses bots to 
purchase large amounts of tickets to sell on StubHub and other resale sites.74 
Per Ticketmaster’s First Amended Complaint, the defendant company asserts 
an unfair advantage against consumers, as “these bots inundate 
Ticketmaster’s website and mobile app with page requests and ticket reserve 
requests at a far higher rate than would be possible for a human.”75 Per 
Ticketmaster’s records, in a four month period, the defendant managed to 
make over 300,000 ticket orders through the use of over 9,000 different 
accounts, even purchasing the majority of tickets for the landmark 
Mayweather-Pacquiao fight.76 
This is not the first time Ticketmaster brought suit against a company 
using bots, previously finding back-to-back success in court against such a 
company.77 In the 2007 case, the court granted Ticketmaster’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction against the defendant company, considering the 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 Daniel Victor, Why You Probably Won’t Get to Use Your Ticketmaster Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/business/media/ticketmaster-lawsuit-vouchers 
.html. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 Id. 
74 See Ticketmaster LLC v. Prestige Entm’t West, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1155 (Cal. C.D. Ct. 
2018). 
75 Id. 
76 Kenneth Lovett, Ticketmaster claims scalper used illegal bots to buy thousands of high-demand 
tickets in new $10M suit, DAILY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ 
ticketmaster-sues-big-time-scalper-10m-article-1.3536405. 
77 See Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Ticketmaster 
LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (Cal. C.D. Ct. 2007). 
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public interest and finding that the company hurts both Ticketmaster and the 
public with its conduct, which “denies consumers the opportunity to purchase 
tickets at their face price.”78 In the subsequent 2008 proceeding, the 
defendant company counterclaimed, asserting that Ticketmaster retains a 
monopoly over retail ticketing.79 The defendant company also alleged that 
Ticketmaster “developed a scheme to obtain a monopoly in the ticket resale 
market,” but the court dismissed the counterclaim.80 
IV. CURRENT ISSUE: TICKETMASTER’S MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES AND 
BOT SCHEME 
Ticketmaster and Live Nation’s 2010 merger deeply troubled many 
across the United States, who believed that this merger would create “an 
industry monolith, one capable of crippling competitors in the ticketing 
business.”81 Officials in the federal government tried to ease the minds of 
critics, with Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney General, stating that 
“[t]here will be enough air and sunlight in this space for strong competitors 
to take root, grow and thrive.”82 However, it has been almost a decade since 
the merger and Live Nation and Ticketmaster continue to dominate ticketing, 
with ticket prices reaching “record highs” and service fees being “far from 
reduced.”83 
In 2017, the massive company promoted around 30,000 shows 
worldwide, for which it sold 500 million tickets, all while also operating over 
200 venues globally.84 Live Nation “manages 500 artists,” while 
Ticketmaster “tickets 80 of the top 100 arenas in the country.”85 Collectively, 
Ticketmaster has its hand in “nearly every facet of the live-event business: 
recording, record sales, licensing, talent management, venue ownership, 
                                                                                                                           
 
78 Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG , 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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ticketing services and even concessions.”86 Ultimately, Ticketmaster controls 
80% of the ticketing market.87 Size is not automatically an indicator of a 
monopoly, but “carries with it an opportunity for abuse,” per the Supreme 
Court.88 It appears that this rings true for Ticketmaster. 
Because the secondary ticketing market is so lucrative, it is no wonder 
that Ticketmaster wanted to expand its reach in this market as well. To do so, 
Ticketmaster allegedly created its own bot called TradeDesk that enables 
scalpers to buy and resell tickets on Ticketmaster without fears of cancelled 
purchases or other consequences, even though this is in direct violation with 
Ticketmaster’s terms of use.89 In early 2018, 100 scalpers used TradeDesk, 
with the largest of these scalpers obtaining an estimated five million tickets 
in one year.90 Ticketmaster’s Professional Reseller Handbook incentivizes 
such massive dealings, stating that Ticketmaster will reduce its fees as 
scalpers reach certain growth milestones such as $500,000 or $1 million in 
yearly sales.91 Such a program ensures that Ticketmaster is able to double 
dip, collecting not only the primary sale’s fees, but also the much more 
lucrative resale fee. 
The scalping scheme is not the only unfair, anti-competitive allegation 
facing Ticketmaster either. For decades now, artists, venues, and other 
businesses accused Ticketmaster of using coercion.92 Back in 1995, Pearl 
Jam decided not to use Ticketmaster for their tour and unveiled 
Ticketmaster’s extensive network of exclusive deals with concert venues, 
which forced fans and artists alike into Ticketmaster’s grasp.93 Also, 
Ticketmaster allegedly told venues that tried to stray from its control that 
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they would lose out on shows promoted and managed by Live Nation, putting 
them “in a literal boycott.”94 
Ticketmaster enjoys massive control over the market, holding 80% of 
the market share,95 which is also comparable to Standard Oil and Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.96 With its merger with Live Nation, Ticketmaster has 
created a massive vertically integrated enterprise, comparable to Paramount 
Pictures and Standard Oil. Ticketmaster and its network control every aspect 
of the live event business, from recording down to even concessions at 
venues.97 Ticketmaster creates the content, manages it, sells tickets for it, and 
promote the events, many of which take place at its own venues, similar to 
Paramount Pictures’ monopoly on the exhibition of its films. 
Not every vertical integration is per se illegal, but applying the Supreme 
Court’s inquiry set forth in Paramount Pictures,98 it is evident that 
Ticketmaster’s vertical integration constitutes an illegal monopoly. While no 
facts present themselves that Ticketmaster and Live Nation’s merger itself 
had any dubious intent or purposes underlying it, but the power created and 
the attendant purpose and intent weigh against Ticketmaster, considering the 
relevant factors of size and nature of the market served.99 
Just because Ticketmaster is a massive enterprise does not make it fail 
this inquiry, but its size provides Ticketmaster “an opportunity for abuse,”100 
which Ticketmaster takes. As set forth in Paramount Pictures, Ticketmaster 
uses “the power created by size . . . to crush . . . competition,” which “is 
potent evidence that the requisite purpose or intent attends the presence of 
monopoly power.”101 Ticketmaster, through Live Nation, controls major 
artists and venues, allowing it to deprive non-Ticketmaster venues of these 
artists and non-Ticketmaster artists of major venues unless they elect to use 
Ticketmaster’s portfolio of services.102 Additionally, venues, competitors, 
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and artists have come forward with allegations of coercion by 
Ticketmaster,103 further supporting this notion that Ticketmaster uses its size 
to prevent competition. 
The market served by Ticketmaster indicates the illegality of this 
vertically integrated enterprise, in regards to “the leverage on the market the 
particular vertical integration makes possible.”104 Ticketmaster’s market 
leverage allows it to deprive artists and venues of crucial parts of the 
market.105 It also allows for Ticketmaster to even deprive consumers of 
primary market tickets, forcing them to purchase higher priced secondary 
market tickets. Ultimately, Ticketmaster and its network of companies 
constitute an illegally vertically integrated enterprise. 
Ticketmaster’s bot scheme, TradeDesk, is a symptom of Ticketmaster’s 
utilization of its massive size and market control to crush competitors, 
indicating the presence of a monopoly. Ticketmaster uses its standing, size, 
and market leverage to bring suits against other companies under legitimate 
guises,106 but these suits merely serve to crush their competitors in the 
secondary market. While Ticketmaster has found success in such lawsuits, it 
has been in direct violation of the Sherman Act, the FTC Act, and the BOTS 
Act through its illegal dealings working directly with scalpers and against 
consumers. These actions are not only illegal, but cost consumers significant 
amounts of money when they are left with no other alternative besides the 
secondary market. In the interests of the public, the federal government must 
take action to protect consumers from Ticketmaster’s behavior.  
V. REMEDIES AND SOLUTIONS 
In the past, Ticketmaster took advantage of its massive size to settle 
cases without actually altering its behavior.107 Instead, the federal 
government, jointly through the Attorney General’s office and the Federal 
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Trade Commission, must bring actions against Ticketmaster in order to 
finally put a stop to Ticketmaster’s monopolistic behavior. 
Recently, consumers brought a class action suit against Ticketmaster in 
response to the news of its ticket scalping scheme,108 but this action will 
likely find little success when it comes to actually curtailing Ticketmaster’s 
behavior. Ticketmaster previously paid out significant sums, but did so in a 
manner that does not actually repair the harms it caused to consumers and 
then continued with its anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair practices.109 
Also, in using Ticketmaster’s website, site users agree to Ticketmaster’s 
terms of use, which includes a waiver of users’ rights to bring or participate 
in a class action lawsuit,110 although it is unclear whether a court would 
uphold such a term for consumers in these circumstances. 
The Attorney General’s Office should bring forth a claim against 
Ticketmaster under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, for conspiring to and 
actually restraining and monopolizing trade and commerce.111 With its bot 
scheme, Ticketmaster conspired with ticket scalpers to use Ticketmaster’s 
bots and resale markets to raise ticket prices through the secondary market 
and actually achieved these means, as did Socony-Vacuum Oil, for which the 
Supreme Court held that the existence of proof of a conspiracy to elevate 
prices, which then caused or assisted in a raise in prices, serves as “proof of 
the actual consummation or execution of a conspiracy” for purposes of the 
Sherman Act.112 
Per the Supreme Court, any enterprise that interferes “with price 
structures is engaged in an unlawful activity,” regardless of whether this 
enterprise controls the market.113 This is a uniform, bright line rule under the 
Sherman Act and the reasonableness of the prices is irrelevant.114 While there 
may not have been any express agreement of what these prices should be, 
Ticketmaster, through TradeDesk, conspired with scalpers to purchase lower 
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priced face value tickets on the primary market to then resell at a much higher 
price on the secondary market, therefore conspiring to raise prices of tickets. 
The statutes allow for fines up to $100,000,000 for corporations and/or 
imprisonment for up to ten years,115 but the Attorney General’s office should 
also pursue an injunction to stop TradeDesk and dissolution of the ticketing 
giant’s network. 
The FTC must also pursue actions against Ticketmaster, under §§ 45 
and 45C of the FTC Act. First, the FTC should use the broad powers granted 
by Congress to set forth a complaint against Ticketmaster to cease and desist 
its bot scheme, which is an unfair method of competition as well as a 
deceptive act.116 This would be an action within FTC, unless appealed to the 
Court of Appeals, but otherwise the FTC would have the power to make an 
official ruling that Ticketmaster’s practices are unfair and deceptive, 
resulting in an official report on the books declaring that such practices are 
unfair and deceptive.117 Unlike the FTC’s earlier run in with Ticketmaster 
that resulted in a settlement,118 the FTC should strive to make an official 
ruling against Ticketmaster in order to curtail Ticketmaster’s behavior. 
Once the FTC has an order in place, Ticketmaster may be fined up to 
$10,000 for each violation of that order and the federal government may then 
pursue mandatory injunctions as well as additional equitable relief as the 
court finds to be appropriate.119 Such a ruling by the FTC would allow the 
FTC to keep Ticketmaster within an arm’s length. In contrast, where 
Ticketmaster and the FTC settled, Ticketmaster paid out a lump sum without 
receiving any official declaration or ruling that its behavior was illegal,120 
allowing Ticketmaster to continue such behaviors. With an official ruling, 
the FTC can continually take Ticketmaster back to court for continuing to 
pursue its bot scheme, where courts may grant equitable relief without any 
prescribed maximum. 
The FTC should also pursue Ticketmaster under the BOTS Act along 
with its action against Ticketmaster under § 45 of the FTC Act. Ticketmaster 
is in direct violation of this act,121 as it created TradeDesk to circumvent 
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Ticketmaster’s own security measures to allow scalpers to violate event 
purchasing limits and order purchasing rules and subsequently selling such 
tickets obtained in violation of this law, which Ticketmaster participated in 
directly. 
Artists and venues have also come up with some very creative solutions 
to beat bots, taking the ball out of Ticketmaster’s court as well. For instance, 
Taylor Swift used a ticketing system for her fan base, which rewards the fans 
that were the most active.122 Hamilton allowed resellers to set their prices in 
the primary market in order to deprive scalpers of these profits, while then 
drastically reducing the prices to $10 for other tickets that are non-
transferable and available through a daily lottery system.123 In Pittsburgh, the 
Cultural Trust required purchasers to make an account with the theater, 
providing information authenticating their humanity in doing so,124 and 
staggered ticket releases “quietly,” releasing additional tickets for purchase 
through its own ticketing service.125 Additionally, limiting the ticket delivery 
method to will call and requiring the credit card used for purchase would also 
be troublesome for bots.126 The GAO also offers several options, including 
delivery delays and face-value resale exchanges.127 Bots are not unbeatable, 
but instead of taking bots to task, Ticketmaster decided to unfairly take 
advantage of them instead. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Scalpers, through bots, artificially inflate the price of tickets by buying 
up massive quantities of them and making them only available to consumers 
on the secondary resale market for far more than the face value. Instead of 
effectively counteracting these bots, Ticketmaster created its own bot that 
allows scalpers to amass significant amounts of tickets at a time to sell on 
Ticketmaster’s resale site, providing the scalpers with ease of use and 
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Ticketmaster with the profits from the fees from both the primary and 
secondary sales of the same tickets. In doing so, Ticketmaster uses its 
massive size and market reach to cripple would be competitors in the 
secondary market and conspires to raise ticket prices for actual consumers. 
Ticketmaster’s actions prove the existence of monopoly power within its 
vertically integrated enterprise, which causes significant harm to the public. 
To protect consumers and the American public generally, the federal 
government must pursue Ticketmaster for its antitrust violations of the 
Sherman Act, the FTC Act, and the BOTS Act in order to enjoin 
Ticketmaster’s behavior and break up its monopoly over the ticketing 
market. 
